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TRUSTS: TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE INDIAN REMEDY
FOR BREACH OF TRUST
Daniel McNeill
No other ethnic minority in the country feels the close, constant
presence of the federal government as does the American Indian.
Agencies within HUD, Health and Human Services, Education,
Justice, and other departments play often crucial roles with
regard to Indian housing, medical care, instruction, legal rep-
resentation, and other needs. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
alone has been called the reservation
realtor, banker, teacher, social worker; it runs the employment
service, vocational and job training program, contract office,
chamber of commerce, highway authority, housing agency,
police department, conservation service, water works, power
company, telephone company, planning office; it is land
developer, patron of the arts, ambassador to and from the out-
side world, and also guardian, protector, and spokesman.'
It is not going too far to say that the United States exercises
"nearly total control over many aspects of Indian life. ' 2
Although ultimately the government obtained this power be-
cause of demographic, economic, technological, and military
factors, its legal sources lie in the United States Constitution,3
various Indian treaties and agreements, executive orders, and
congressional statutes.' From all of these, the courts have in-
ferred-and it is now well-settled-that a trust relationship exists
between Indians and the government.5 As trustee, the govern-
ment is obliged to manage tribal affairs solely in the interest of
Indian beneficiaries.6 The Supreme Court has held the govern-
ment to "the most exacting fiduciary standards" 7 in this task.
1. OUR BROTHER'S KEEPER: THE INDIAN IN WHITE AMERICA 157 (Cohn & Hearne
ed. 1970). The Indian Self-Determination Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450a to 450u, now
allows tribes to contract with the government for delivery of these services. The pervasive
influence of the government remains, however.
2. C. Scott, Administrative Law: Self-Determination and the Consent Power: The
Role of the Government in Indian Decisions, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 195 (1977).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
4. Generally collected in Title 25 of the United States Code.
5. For 24 case citations to this effect, see Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the
Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1213 (1975).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1959); A. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 2.3
(1939); G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 541 (rev. ed. 1978). The Scott and Bogert
treatises will hereinafter be cited only as Scorr, BOGERT.
7. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942).
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Thus Indians would seem to enjoy a charmed relationship with
the United States, one whose only danger would be the dolce far
niente of the gilded cage. In fact, though, among American
minority groups today, Indians have the highest rates of poverty,'
ignorance,9 infant mortality,10 and hunger and malnutrition."
One observer has noted that "on every scale of measure-
ment-employment, income, education, health-the condition of
Indian people ranks at the bottom."' 12
Moreover, the government has systematically doled out Indian
natural resources to its own favorites. "Indian history is full of
instances of 'sweetheart' contracts for mining and mineral explo-
ration approved by the government, contrary to the Indians' best
interests and for a fraction of their true value."'I3 Such largesse
has also extended to agencies within the government itself, such
as the Bureaus of Mines and Reclamation. 4
These deprivations raise urgent questions about the enforce-
ability of the government's trusteeship obligations. The Supreme
Court has never recognized an Indian cause of action under
general jurisdiction for breach of trust." Moreover, the Court
has never articulated more than the shadow of a specific legal
structure for the trust relationship, and few, if any, commen-
tators have attempted to supply one. Lacking such a structure,
the trust has tended to become a vaporous entity, whose shifting,
uncertain contours have lent themselves to diverse and contradic-
tory interpretations by different courts.
This note examines the current possibilities for establishing an
effective Indian remedy for breach of trust. The first part deals
with the elements of a trust in general and forms the foundation
for the discussion. The second part treats potential obstacles to
the cause of action, with particular emphasis on United States v.
Mitchell" and the difficulties it suggests may inhere in sovereign
8. S. LEVITAN & W. JOHNSON, INDIAN GIVING: FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR NATIVE
AMERICANS 11 (1975).
9. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, AN EVEN CHANCE 2 (1971).
10. OUR BROTHER'S KEEPER: THE INDIAN IN WHITE AMERICA 157 (Cohn & Hearne
ed. 1970).
11. Id.
12. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations
for Indian Policy, H.R. Doc. No. 363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970).
13. C. Scott, supra note 2, at 198.
14. Id.
15. Seminole Nation v. United States and similar cases were all brought under
special jurisdictional statutes.
16. 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
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immunity and statutory interpretation. The third part suggests
specific theoretical models for the Indian-government trust rela-
tionship, with the aim of at least beginning to construct a frame-
work appropriate for this special field.
Elements of a Trust
A trust is a legal device by which one person conveys property
to a second, to be managed in the interests of a third. It common-
ly exhibits five main parts: the trust corpus, the settlor, the
manifestation of intent, the beneficiary, and the trustee.
The trust corpus is the property that forms the subject matter
of the relationship. It is the central feature, against which the
rights of the beneficiary and the duties of the trustee are
understood. 17
The settlor creates the trust by passing title to the corpus to the
trustee on behalf of the beneficiary. As original owner of the
property, he has considerable latitude in determining the scope of
the trust. He may, for instance, appoint himself trustee.'8 He
may retain the power to modify or revoke the relationship at
will.' 9 However, no trust is created unless the settlor manifests an
intention to impose enforceable duties.20 Moreover, though the
settlor may limit some of the trustee's obligations,
[a] provision in the trust instrument is not effective to relieve
the trustee of liability for breach of trust committed in bad
faith or intentionally or with reckless indifference to the in-
terest of the beneficiary, or of liability for any profit which the
trustee has derived from a breach of trust.2'
The beneficiary thus has certain equitable rights which no settlor
may deny. Because a trust may be created by statute, there need
be no individual settlor.22
The manifestation of intent provides evidence of the creation
of a trust and, generally, defines the corpus and the terms of the
trust. A settlor may manifest his intent by written words, spoken
words, or behavior, or all three,23 and the courts may look to all
17. SCOTT, § 3.1.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 17(a)(1959).
19. Id. § 37.
20. Id. § 23.
21. Id. § 222(2). See ScoTT, § 222; BOGERT, § 542.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 23, comment c (1959).
23. Id. § 24(l).
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relevant circumstances to discern the terms of the trust.2 4 How-
ever, the presumption is that the common law of trusts will define
the terms unless "the settlor manifests a different intention in a
manner which admits of proof in a judicial proceeding ....25 The
burden of such proof thus rests with the settlor.
The beneficiary is the individual for whom the trust is set up.
Broadly speaking, his rights are the obverse of the trustee's
duties. The beneficiary possesses five equitable remedies against
the trustee: "1) [T~he specific enforcement of the duties of the
trustee under the trust; 2) an injunction against a threatened
breach of trust; 3) redress for breach of trust; 4) the appointment
of a receiver; 5) the removal of the trustee." 26 The third is easily
the most common cause of action.
The trustee administers the trust on behalf of the beneficiary.
"One of the most fundamental duties of the trustee is that he
must display throughout administration of the trust complete
loyaltyto the interests of the beneficiary, and must exclude all
selfish interests and all considerations of the interests of third per-
sons." 27 As a general rule, he must not merely refrain from harm-
ing the beneficiary's interests but must actively promote them. He
has the duty "to use reasonable care and skill to make the trust
property productive,"28 "to defend actions which may result in a
loss to the trust estate, ' 29 "to keep the trust property separate
from his individual property"30 (thus "a trustee cannot properly
lend trust property to himself"'1 ), and "to use reasonable care
and skill to preserve the trust property.' '1 2 The fiduciary may
breach his obligation "even if he does the best he can, if his best
is not good enough."" An errant trustee may be held liable for
any loss resulting from, profit made because of, or profit which
would have been made in the absence of the breach.14
24. ScoTT, § 4.
25. Id.
26. Id. § 199. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 199 (1959); BOGERT, §§
519-28, 543(v), 861, 945-46.
27. BOGERT, § 543.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 181 (1959). See ScoTT, § 181; BOGERT, §
541.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 178. See ScoTT. § 178; BOGERT. § 581.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 179. See ScoTT, § 179; BOGERT, § 541.
31. Scorr, § 170.17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 191; BOGERT, § 543(j).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 176. See SCOTT, § 174; BOGERT, § 541;
Costello v. Costello, 209 N.Y. 252, 261, 103 N.E. 148, 152 (1913).
33. SCOTT, § 201. See BOGERT, § 541.
34. SCOTT, § 205. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205; BOGERT, § 543(v).
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The courts have consistently found that, without this high
standard of conduct on the part of the trustee, the institution of
the trust would be jeopardized. As Bogert says:
By reason of the intimate knowledge which the fiduciary has
with respect to the financial affairs of the principal, the su-
periority of his position, his usual influence with the principal,
and the latter's trust and confidence in the fiduciary, there is
great opportunity for the exercise of fraud and undue in-
fluence. 5
Or, as Chief Judge (later Justice) Cardozo observed, in a famous
passage:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the punc-
tilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of
behavior . . . .Only thus has the level of conduct for fidu-
ciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the
crowd.36
If the courts did not require the trustee to balance his great power
over the affairs of the beneficiary with "an honor the most sen-
sitive," he might show little honor at all.
Congress as Trustee
The history of the congressional relationship with Indians aptly
illustrates the Bogert and Cardozo warnings.
Though Congress derives its power over Indians from the com-
merce and treaty clauses of the Constitution,37 nothing in their
language suggests that the legislative branch would ever become
trustee of Indian property. It took a pair of Supreme Court deci-
sions vesting title to Indian land in the United States to send Con-
gress on the road to trusteeship. In Johnson v. M'Intosh, Chief
Justice Marshall baldly stated the rationale for the transfer of
ownership: "Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the con-
queror cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative opin-
ions of individuals may be, respecting the original justice of the
claim which has been successfully asserted." 8 Eight years later,
35. BOGERT, § 544.
36. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
38. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588 (1823).
1980]
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in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, he restated the principle more
broadly: "[The Indians] occupy a territory to which we assert a
title independent of their will." '39 As one cannot be a trustee
without title to a corpus, these decisions made the trusteeship
possible.
However, since the government obtained this title from the In-
dians "independent of their will," the relationship began as one
of exploitation rather than protection. Subsequent events ampli-
fied its larcenous nature. For instance, in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, open, arable land began to grow scarce in the United States,
and pressure mounted to hand Indian territory over to white set-
tlers. Congress thus enacted numerous statutes which, like the
General Allotment Act of 1887, effectively mulcted Indians of
their land. Rapid white occupation often followed such legisla-
tion. The intransigence of these pioneers, and their political
clout, placed the Supreme Court in a delicate situation regarding
these acts. If it applied the private law of trusts to them, it would
have to order the removal of thousands of whites. Such a deci-
sion risked a defiance similar to that which occurred after
Worcester v. Georgia,4" a case which threatened white interests to
a much lesser extent than such a "dispossession" ruling would
have. The power of judicial review was still not firmly established
in the late 1800s, and the Court may have felt that, in Indian
cases, to use it was to lose it. On the other hand, if the Court ig-
nored fiduciary law entirely, it both flouted the germinal princi-
ple announced by Marshall in Cherokee Nation4' and appeared to
39. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
40. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
41. "[The Indians'] relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his
guardian." 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16. The clarity of the government-Indian relationship has
not been helped at all by the terminology used by the courts to describe it. Outstanding
among the semantic offenders have been the words "ward" and "guardian," which have
specific legal meanings and which have been continually used where they can only mean
"beneficiary" and "trustee." For instance, the Supreme Court recently quoted with ap-
proval the following formulation of a lower court: "On the other hand, if a trustee (or
the government in its dealings with the Indians) does not attempt to give the ward the fair
equivalent of what he acquires from him, the trustee to that extent has taken rather than
transmuted the property of the ward." United States v. Sioux Nation, 488 U.S. 371
(1980). Moreover, "ward" has been employed so loosely as to have become meaningless
even as a word of art. Felix Cohen identified at least ten different senses in which the
term "wardship" had been used: (1) as suggestive of the "domestic dependent nation"
concept of Cherokee Nation; (2) as indicative of special tribal subjection to congressional
power; (3) as indicative of individual Indian subjection to congressional power; (4) as
synonymous with "subject to the jurisdiction of the federal courts"; (5) as indicative of
Indian subjection to administrative power; (6) as suggestive of beneficiary status; (7) as
[Vol. 8
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grant approval to wanton treaty breaking and racial theft. The
middle way out of this dilemma contained strong internal con-
tradictions, but the Court took it anyway. Its decisions stressed
the fiduciary role of the government again and again but general-
ly refrained from granting relief for abuse of that role. Congress
gained the power of a trustee without the duties. Indians found
themselves "beneficiaries" of an essentially unenforceable trust.
Confusion between congressional exploitation and protection
of Indians reached its highest pitch in the early years of this cen-
tury. In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock 2 the Court declared that Con-
gress possessed "plenary," i.e., absolute, power over Indians,
and that as trustee it could pass any statutes or break any treaties
it wished, and as long as its actions were constitutional the
judiciary would not inquire further into them. As Felix Cohen
pointed out in 1941, this doctrine stood the trusteeship on its
head: "In private law, a guardian is subject to rigid court control
in the administration of the ward's affairs and property. In [In-
dian] law the guardianship relation has generally been invoked as
a reason for relaxing court control over the action of the 'guar-
dian'.""3 Moreover, not only could the Court find that the
trusteeship justified exploitation, but that such exploitation in
turn justified the trusteeship: "From [the Indians'] very weakness
and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the
Federal Government with them. . . there arises the duty of pro-
tection, and with it the power.'"
For years after Lone Wolf, Congress was the paramount
source of Indian law. The first assertion of ultimate judicial
supremacy came in 1937, with Shoshone Tribe v. United States.5
There, the Court held that Congress could not unilaterally
abrogate Indian treaty rights without providing just compensa-
tion. The decision did not explicitly refer to congressional
trusteeship duties, but Justice Cardozo, tersely concluding that
"spoliation is not management, '4 6 clearly implied that such
duties exist.
equivalent to "noncitizenship"; (8) as indicative of the presence of a restraint upon the
alienation of Indian land; (9) as explanatory of the rule that doubtful clauses in treaties,
statutes, and agreements are to be resolved in favor of the Indians; and (10) as suggestive
of an Indian right to particular boons from the government. F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN
LAv 170-73 (1941).
42. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
43. COHEN, supra note 41, at 171 (emphasis in original).
44. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
45. 299 U.S. 476 (1937).
46. Id. at 498.
1980]
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In 1974, with Morton v. Mancari,"7 the Court indicated con-
gressional responsibility directly. In upholding special promo-
tional preferences for Indians working in the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, it stated that "as long as the special treatment can be tied
rationally to the fullfillment of Congress' unique obligation
toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be dis-
turbed."" 8 Of course, the Court here invoked the "unique obliga-
tion" to countenance, rather than restrain, congressional power.
The "obligation" thus seemed optional rather than mandatory.
Moreover, the decision left some question as to whether the
rational-tie test merely limited the amount of special treatment
Indians could receive vis-A-vis whites, or whether it had wider
scope.
The Court clarified the latter issue in Delaware Tribal Business
Committee v. Weeks."9 It referred to the Morton test as "the
standard of review most recently expressed,"5 0 and applied it to a
case involving not special treatment but distribution of funds
among competing groups of Delaware Indians. The sweep of the
test has thus been increased significantly.
That the trust responsibility limits congressional action is now
clear. But problems remain. The extent of the congressional obli-
gation is uncertain, as are the criteria for a rational tie. More-
over, despite the recent ruling that Morton and Weeks "establish
a standard of review for judging the constitutionality of Indian
legislation under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment," 51 it is still true that the Court has never struck down a
piece of congressional legislation bearing on Indians. The power
of Congress is no longer plenary, but it remains substantial.
Executive Branch as Trustee
Traditionally, the courts have viewed the executive branch as
something of an agent of Congress in regard to Indian affairs.
Thus, while they have been willing to play the Pollyanna with
respect to Congress, they have been much more vigilant over the
executive branch. This concern stems not only from the greater
potential of the executive to commit concrete injustice but also
from the greater confidence the Court has felt in overturning ex-
ecutive actions. The main line of cases in this century strongly
47. 417 U.S. 535 (1977).
48. Id. at 555.
49. 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
50. Id. at 85.
51. United States v. Sioux Nation, 488 U.S. 371, 414 (1980).
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suggests that the principles of private trust law apply directly to
the executive branch.
In 1919, with Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa,52 the Court made
it clear that the Lone Wolf teaching did not extend to the ex-
ecutive branch. It forbade the government from dispensing In-
dian territory as if it were public land, stating that such action
"would not be an exercise of the guardianship, but an act of con-
fiscation." 53
The Court went farther four years later in Cramer v. United
States,54 where it held that the general trust responsibility of the
government protected Indians not otherwise covered by treaty,
statute, or executive order from arbitrary alienation of their land.
It stated, "The fact that [an Indian] right of occupancy finds no
recognition in any statute or other formal governmental action is
not conclusive." 55 In effect, the Court found that the written
words, spoken words, and behavior of the government combined
to form a manifestation of intent to create a trust, and that
henceforth Indian rights under that trust need not be limited to
those in the written documents.
In United States v. Creek Nation56 the Court awarded money
damages to Indians whose land had been sold because of an in-
correct federal survey of the reservation boundary. It ruled that
the executive branch was "subject to limitations inhering in ... a
guardianship, '" 7 though it did not specify what those limitations
might be.
Two subsequent cases were more explicit, but because they
were brought under special jurisdictional statutes, their preceden-
tial value today is uncertain. In Seminole Nation v. United
States,58 the Court held the government to "the most exacting
fiduciary standards." 59 And in Menominee Tribe v. United
States, ° the Court of Claims declared that "the court shall apply
as respects the United States the same principles of law as would
be applied to an ordinary fiduciary." 6'
Since Seminole, the Court has not elaborated on the extent of
52. 249 U.S. 110 (1919).
53. Id. at 113.
54. 261 U.S. 219 (1923).
55. Id. at 229.
56. 295 U.S. 103 (1935), reh. denied, 295 U.S. 769 (1935).
57. Id. at 110.
58. 316 U.S. 286 (1942).
59. Id. at 297.
60. 101 Ct. CI. 10 (1944).
61. Id. at 18.
19801
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the executive fiduciary liability. However, recently a few district
courts have handed down decisions which expand and clarify the
responsibility considerably. In Manchester Band of Pomo Indians
v. United States,62 the court found that the government "is under
a duty to the beneficiary to use reasonable care and skill to make
the trust property productive. '" '63 Noting that the government in
this instance had not done so, it entered a judgment of breach of
trust against it. Manchester is the first case in which the govern-
ment has been held liable for failure to take action to implement
its trust obligation.
In Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton,"' Indians contested a
harmful government diversion of water away from Pyramid
Lake, a shallow inland sea wholly within the reservation. Apply-
ing a rational basis standard and the Seminole private law test,
the court found that the government failed on both and enjoined
the diversion. Thus, the trust responsibility was extended beyond
direct management of the Indian trust corpus to embrace actions
that might only secondarily affect Indian welfare."
The private law of trusts is a coherent, rational structure, with
powers balanced against protections, duties against rights. Its
purpose is to advance the interests of the beneficiary, according
to the wishes of the settlor, and it is well-suited to that end.
But the government-Indian trust has, historically, been less a
structure than a series of catchwords. Trustee powers have far
outrun beneficiary protections. Trustee duties have been largely
voluntary and beneficiary rights hence unenforceable. The legal
contradictions have been an embarrassment to the profession.
The trust relationship has resembled a state of vassalage. The
government has fallen to Cardozo's level "trodden by the
crowd," and the "fraud and undue influence" Bogert cautioned
against have proliferated. As those eminent authorities noted,
such is the inevitable result of failure to impose a clear protective
framework on a trust relationship.
Current Obstacles to Effective Remedy
The historical, political, and institutional conditions that gave
the government-Indian trust its unilateral aspect today no longer
62. 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
63. Id. at 1245.
64. 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973).
65. A holding with many potential ramifications, given the serious conflicts of in-
terest within the Department of Interior.
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exist. Yet certain technical barriers to an effective Indian remedy
for breach of trust may still obtain. These include a case, salient
because of its possible precedential value, and two recently an-
nounced principles.
United States v. Mitchell
The Quinault Indian Tribe has long lived on the western flank
of the Olympic Peninsula in Washington State. The land there is
heavily forested, and was, for their purposes, fit mainly for hunt-
ing and fishing. By the Treaty of Olympia" in 1859, the govern-
ment granted them 200,000 acres of it for their own use.
However, in 1887, Congress passed the General Allotment
Act,67 which fragmented reservations, and which stated in Section
568 that the United States would "hold the land thus allotted...
in trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian to whom such
an allotment shall have been made. . . ." Legislators clearly saw
this act as a device to induce Indians to abandon tribalism for in-
dividualism and nomadism for farming and ranching. On the
wooded Quinault Reservation, though, such pursuits were highly
impractical, and perhaps for this reason allotment did not com-
mence there until 1905, nor finish until 1933.
By the Act of June 25, 1910,9 Congress authorized the Depart-
ment of Interior to market timber on Indian land. In 1920 the
department began harvesting and selling lumber from the
Quinault Reservation. Since then, the BIA has handled all aspects
of the operation-receipt of bids, award of contracts, supervision
of cutting and processing, and collection and distribution of pro-
ceeds. 70 The 1934 Indian Reorganization Act7' mandated that all
Indian forests be run on a sustained-yield basis, and in 1949 the
Department of Interior issued its own guidelines ordering that all
Indian timberlands be kept in a perpetually productive state.
Before 1946 sovereign immunity prevented tribes from suing
the United States in federal court without congressional passage
of a special jurisdictional statute to that end. The process of ob-
taining such a statute was, of course, arduous and often seeming-
ly endless. In that year, Congress passed the Indian Claims Com-
66. 12 Stat. 971 (1859).
67. 24 Stat. 388, ch. 119, 25 U.S.C. §§ 331 et seq. (1970).
68. 25 U.S.C. § 348.
69. 36 Stat. 857, ch. 431, 25 U.S.C. §§ 406, 407 (1970).
70. Even today, the Quinaults are not allowed to cut timber on their land without
posting bond to the BIA and gaining its permission. 25 C.F.R. 141.19 (1979).
71. 48 Stat. 986, ch. 576, 25 U.S.C. § 466 (1970).
19801
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mission Act,72 which gave Indians essentially the same right of ac-
cess to the Court of Claims as the Tucker Act" conferred on
other citizens. In passing the Indian Claims Commission Act,
Congress noted that, unless Indians had effective recourse to sue
for governmental mismanagement of trust property, there would
continue to be "encourage[ment of] bureaucratic disregard of the
rights of Indian citizens by a small minority of governmental of-
ficials who are comforted by the thought that there is no judicial
redress available to the victims of their maladministration. ' 74
In 1971 allottees of the Quinault Reservation brought suit in
the Court of Claims under the Indian Claims Commission and
Tucker acts, to recover money damages for government misman-
agement of their timberlands. They alleged that the government
(1) failed to obtain fair market value for timber sold; (2) failed
to manage timber on a sustained-yield basis and to rehabilitate
the land after logging; (3) failed to obtain payment for some
merchantable timber; (4) failed to develop a proper system of
roads and easements for timber operations, and exacted im-
proper charges from allottees for roads; (5) failed to pay in-
terest on certain funds and paid insufficient interest on other
funds; and (6) exacted excessive administrative charges from
allottees."
The evidence for malfeasance was strong.
The Court of Claims ordered money damages for the plaintiffs
in 1979.76 It found that the General Allotment Act imposed a
fiduciary obligation upon the United States and that the govern-
ment had breached it. Since the Act was sufficient to decide the
case, the court did not need to reach the Quinaults' contention
that subsequent statutes had also made the government liable.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. In essence, it held
that the General Allotment Act "cannot be read as establishing
that the United States has a fiduciary responsibility for manage-
ment of allotted forest lands. ' 7  Rather, "the Act created only a
limited trust relationship ' 78 between the United States and the
tribe, one which did not include reservation timber in the corpus.
72. 60 Stat. 1055, ch. 959, 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 et seq. (1970).
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970).
74. H.R. REP. No. 1466, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1945).
75. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 537 (1980).
76. Mitchell v. United States, 591 F.2d 1300 (1979).
77. 445 U.S. 535, 546 (1980).
78. Id. at 542.
[Vol. 8
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The Court adduced three reasons for this interpretation of the
statute: the other provisions of the Act, its legislative history, and
the restrictive Indian laws of the time.
First, the Court observes that sections 1 and 2 of the Act pro-
vide that the Indian allottees, not the government, are to control
and manage the allotments. The implication is that such Indian
control cannot coexist with full fiduciary responsibility on the
part of the government. However, the Court fails to demonstrate
that this conclusion necessarily follows because Indian manage-
ment does not preclude federal assistance to make the lands pro-
fitable. Moreover, sections 1 and 2 explicitly contemplate "agri-
cultural and grazing"7" uses, not logging. Timber management on
reservations almost demands such federal assistance because it re-
quires a high degree of organization, substantial capitalization,
significant expertise, and a broad expanse of territory. As the Act
itself had shivered the reservation into parcels, the government
was perhaps the only agency capable of harvesting the wood.
Second, the Court examines the intent of legislators, and finds
that "the legislative history of the Act plainly indicates that the
trust Congress placed on the allotted lands is of limited scope." 80
The Court states that the preliminary versions of the Act pro-
vided only that Indians were to hold title subject to a restraint on
alienation. Senator Dawes altered this language when it occurred
to him that the statute would afford allottees no protection from
state taxation. By placing title in the United States, 8 Dawes
believed Indians could avoid the encroachments of state govern-
ment. Thus, the Court concludes, Congress included trust lan-
guage in the Act, "not because it wished the Government to con-
trol use of the land and be subject to money damages for
breaches of fiduciary duty, but simply because it wished to pre-
vent alienation of the land and to insure that allottees would be
immune from state taxation."8 " However, it neither follows that
the reasons for creating a trust limit its scope, nor that they limit
more expansive language in a written manifestation. For instance,
if a settlor creates a trust because he never wants to see his son go
on welfare, it does not follow that the duty of the trustee is
limited to preventing that contingency, especially if the written
manifestation states only that the trustee must "hold the [trust
79. 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1970).
80. 445 U.S. 535, 543 (1980).
81. The United States was to issue patents in the name of individual Indians, who
would in turn take title at some later (and as yet unreached) date. 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1970).
82. 445 U.S. 535, 544 (1980).
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property] . ..in trust for the sole use and benefit of' the son.
Thus, it is possible that while the danger of state taxation may
have inspired the trust clause, Senator Dawes intended it to ex-
tend broader protection to Indians. This interpretation gains
some force when one realizes that if the senator had wished mere-
ly to prevent alienation and taxation, he could have omitted the
clause entirely. The government already held title to Indian land.
It would have continued to hold title if the trust language had
never been used. Thus, the presence of such language suggests
Congress intended a larger purpose.
Third, the Court presents other evidence from the period, most
of it demonstrating that Indians at this time had no legal right to
harvest reservation lumber. For instance, according to United
States v. Cook, "If the timber should be severed [by an Indian]
for the purposes of sale alone .. . then the cutting would be
wrongful, and the timber, when cut, become the absolute proper-
ty of the United States." 83 The Court notes that Congress did not
give the Department of Interior the authority to sell timber for
"the benefit of the Indians"" until the Act of June 25, 1910.83
Hence, the General Allotment Act, alone, cannot "impose any
duty upon the Government to manage timber resources." 86 But
the Court refused to consider whether the Act of June 25 or any
other statute might "render the United States liable in money
damages for the mismanagement alleged in this case." 87 It
justified this refusal on the grounds that the Court of Claims had
not considered the argument. However, the Court of Claims had
no reason to consider it because it had already ruled that the
General Allotment Act rendered the government liable. More-
over, the Supreme Court is not bound by the arguments the lower
courts address. It is free to consider any line of reasoning
presented to it. The Court's procedure here was so extraordinary
as to merit serious explanation. In effect, it reduced the issue to
one far narrower than that contemplated by either of the parties,
then offered a decision that consequently had only tangential
relation to the reality of the case. The dissent, of course, found
no difficulty in taking these statutes into account.8
83. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591, 593-94 (1874).
84. 445 U.S. 535, 545 (1980).
85. 36 Stat. 857, ch. 431, § 7, 25 U.S.C. § 407 (1970).
86. 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980).
87. Id. at 546.
88. Id. at 549-50.
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It is important to discuss other factors the Court did not decide
in Mitchell, and why. First, it did not reach the issue of whether a
full, uncontested fiduciary obligation on the part of the govern-
ment would create an enforceable Indian right. It felt there was
no need to treat this matter because the General Allotment Act
created only a limited trust.
Second, the Court did not consider the tribe's assertion that
the overall government-Indian trust relationship disposed of this
case. It avoided this claim on the ground that the tribe had not
presented it before the Court of Claims. Again, this shortcoming
did not prevent the dissent from taking the matter into considera-
tion. 9
Third, the Court did not consider whether the Tucker Act
comprehends the alleged misproprieties because they involved
money wrongfully obtained or withheld. It stated, again, that
because the Court of Claims had not reached this issue, it would
not.
Fourth, the Court did not consider whether the General Allot-
ment Act and the Treaty of Olympia,90 combined, create an im-
plied contract within the purview of the Tucker Act. Again, it
stated that the Quinaults had not argued this point before the
Court of Claims, so it would not rule on the issue.
Finally, it is worth noting that this case was appealed, not by
the government in toto but by the Justice Department. The De-
partment of Interior had earlier submitted a memo asserting:
"There is a legally enforceable trust obligation owed by the
United States Government to American Indian tribes. This obli-
gation originated in the course of dealings between the govern-
ment and the Indians, and is reflected in the treaties, agreements
and statutes pertaining to Indians."'" Interior thus took no part
in the appeal. The Mitchell Court ignored the memo.
The majority opinion in Mitchell exhibits at least three fun-
damental flaws, each of them essential to the outcome of the
case:
(1) It characterizes a straightforward passage as unclear.
There is nothing obscure about a provision that the United States
shall "hold the land thus allotted ... in trust for the sole use and
benefit of the Indian" 9 allottee. As the dissent notes, "The act
89. Id. at 547.
90. 12 Stat. 971 (1859).
91. Memo of Nov. 21, 1978. See Brief for Appellee at app. 2a.
92. 25 U.S.C. § 348.
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could hardly be more explicit as to the status of the allotted
lands." 93
(2) It then goes at once to legislative intent and relies solely
upon this test to interpret the clause. Both the haste and the em-
phasis are unwarranted, for this procedure ignores Indian vulner-
ability to Congress, tends to perpetuate the outmoded policies of
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and does not ade-
quately take into account the general ambiguity of legislative in-
tent itself.
(3) It fails to consider statutes not merely relevant to the con-
troversy but central to it. This baffling approach will probably do
little more than consume the additional time and money of both
the Quinaults and the government. The Court did not even at-
tempt to justify it.
As an obstacle to an effective Indian remedy for breach of
trust, the status of Mitchell is uncertain. The decision itself-that
the trust corpus created by the General Allotment Act did not in-
clude reservation timber-cannot bar many Indian actions for
forestry mismanagement because most of these, like the
Quinaults' claim itself, will rest on statutes like the Act of June
25, 1910.
However, Mitchell may have laid down language from which
more obstructive decisions can be cantilevered. Its statements on
statutory interpretation and sovereign immunity may affect how
future trust questions are understood, or whether they are reached
at all. The greatest precedential barrier in Mitchell may lie not in
its conclusion but in its serpentine reasoning.
Statutory Interpretation
Two issues of statutory interpretation surface in Mitchell: (1)
When is a statute unclear? (2) If it is unclear, what principles of
interpretation should the Court resort to?94
With regard to the first question, the dissent observes that the
plain sense of statutory language is the starting-point for all inter-
pretation.95 In order to defeat the standard of common under-
93. 445 U.S. 535, 547 (1980).
94. There is, of course, a third: When should the Court consider other statutes in
pari materia with the one before it? But the answer to this question, i.e., when they are
relevant, is so obvious, and the logically subsequent question, i.e., when are they rele-
vant?, is so poorly focused in the opinion, that the matter will not be dealt with in detail
here. But see note 110, infra.
95. 445 U.S. 535, 547-48 (1980). See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug
Co., 440 U.S. 205, 210 (1979); Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979).
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standing, substantial ambiguity is required, for even "when the
law does not define a statutory phrase precisely," '96 the Court will
"give the words of the statute their ordinary meaning. ' 97 It is
when the words reasonably lend themselves to more than one or-
dinary meaning that a statute becomes unclear.
In Mitchell, the plain meaning standard is ignored. The start-
ing point becomes pellucidity. The Court states: "The Act does
not unambiguously provide that the United States has undertaken
full fiduciary responsibilities as to the management of allotted
lands." 98 Because the statute is not unambiguous, the Court may
apply other canons of interpretation to it. It is important to note
that "not unambiguous" does not mean the same thing as "am-
biguous," any more than "not poor" means the same thing as
"wealthy." A phrase that has a 95 percent chance of meaning
one specific thing is "not unambiguous," but it is not "am-
biguous" either. The Mitchell standard would allow the most
frail possibility of alternate meaning to justify interpretation
beyond the obvious sense of the words.
Such an approach is unwise for several reasons. First, it im-
poses a heavy burden of clarity upon legislators. Lawmakers do
not have the time to define all their terms beyond cavil. As long
as their words are sufficiently clear to the ordinary understand-
ing, there is no point in demanding the extra effort of them. Sec-
ond, the public relies on the plain meaning of legislation. Exces-
sive judicial interpretation introduces an uncertainty to statutes
that is not in the general interest. Third, the ordinary meaning of
statutory language is the best evidence of collective legislative in-
tent, both because draftsmen believe their words will be con-
strued in their plain sense, and because a statute represents the
consensus of the legislative body as a whole, rather than merely
the beliefs of its sponsors.
Once a statute is deemed unclear, the question arises as to
which tenets of interpretation should be used to clarify it. That
these tenets should have some relation to the subject matter of
the legislation seems obvious. For instance, statutory vagueness
provokes very different judicial reactions in contract, criminal,
and freedom of expression cases. Thus, inquiry into the nature of
Indian legislation is essential.
Congress has passed laws bearing on Indians since its incep-
96. 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 542.
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tion.19 However, before 1871 treaties defined most important
legal relations between the government and the Indians. Chief
Justice Marshall stated the guiding principle for interpretation of
these documents in 1832: "The language used in treaties with In-
dians should never be construed to their prejudice."' 10 This
canon has never been seriously contested.
In the Indian Appropriations Act of 1871,101 Congress forbade
further Indian treaties and assumed the power of legislating on
matters that would previously have been negotiated by treaty.
Nonetheless, it recognized the basic bilateral nature of Indian
statutes-stemming from ethnic difference and centuries of
hostility-when it implemented at once an agreement procedure.
Representatives of the government and of the Indians would
discuss and conclude a pact, which would then be sent to Con-
gress. If passed, the agreement possessed the form and force of a
statute. In a case involving such a statute, but applying to other
instruments as well, the Court stated:
Doubtful expressions, instead of being resolved in favor of the
United States, are to be resolved in favor of a weak and
defenseless people, who are wards of the nation, and depen-
dent wholly upon its protection and good faith. This rule of
construction has been recognized, without exception, for more
than a hundred years .... 102
99. For example, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, ratified by the First Congress in
1789, declared, "The utmost good faith shall always be observed toward the Indians;
their lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in
their property, rights and liberty they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just
and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity shall,
from time to time, be made, for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserv-
ing peace and friendship with them. Art. III, 1 Stat. 50, 52."
100. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582 (1832). Accord, Tulee v.
Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684 (1942); Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194,
198 (1918); United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 599 (1910); United States v. Winans, 198
U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905); Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1886);
Wan-Zop-E-Ah v. Miami County Comm'rs, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 759, 760 (1866); Kansas In-
dians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 760 (1866).
101. 25 U.S.C.A. § 71 (1971).
102. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912). Accord, Washington v. Washington
State Comm'l Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979); Washington v.
Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 484 (1979); Nor-
them Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 656 (1976); Bryan v. Itasca County,
426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976); DeCoteau v. District County Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 444 (1975); An-
toine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 200 (1975); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n,
411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930).
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The Choate standard thus derives from three explicit concerns:
fiduciary obligation, Indian vulnerability, and precedent.103
These considerations apply equally to statutes which do not
develop from agreements,' 4 as the Court has noted.'05 As recent-
ly as 1976, the Court affirmed that "statutes passed for the
benefit of the Indians are to be liberally construed and all doubts
are to be resolved in their favor."'0 6
At the same time, however, another line of cases has begun
eroding the canon. In Mattz v. Arnett, the Court laid down the
requirement that "congressional determination to terminate [an
Indian reservation] must be expressed on the face of the Act or be
clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative
history." 7 The Court may consider the words of the statute and
the legislature's intent, but it must apply the Choate standard to
both. Or, to put it more specifically in Choate terms: If both ex-
pression and intent are doubtful, a statute must be resolved in
favor of the Indians.
Four years later, Justice Rehnquist changed the standard once
again, in an attempt to prevent Indians from receiving the benefit
of any doubt: "In all cases, 'the face of the Act,' the 'surround-
ing circumstances,' and the 'legislative history,' are to be exam-
ined with an eye toward determining what congressional intent
was. Mattz v. Arnett, supra, at 505." 18 The reliance on Mattz is
misplaced, to say the least, since this approach voids the Mattz
rule. If rephrased to align with Choate, it holds: Whether expres-
sion is doubtful or clear, a statute must be resolved according to
legislative intent. Or, in terms of the plain meaning doctrine: The
ordinary sense of statutes is never enough for proper interpreta-
tion; one must always consider legislative intent.
103. Implicit considerations include, among others, lack of Indian fluency in English
and lack of Indian acquaintance with American legal terms.
104. One observer, an attorney for the Justice Department, has recently suggested
that Choate ought to apply only to treaties and agreement/statutes, and not to ordinary
statutes, because the former are arrived at bilaterally and the latter unilaterally. This con-
fuses procedure with essence. The fact that Congress can pass legislation without Indian
consent does not vaporize the factors of trusteeship, vulnerability, and precedent which
led to Choate in the first place. Decker, The Construction of Indian Treaties, Agreements
and Statutes, 5 AM. INDAN L. RaV. 299-311 (1977).
105. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976); United States v. S.F. Pac.
R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 354 (1941); Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 87
(1918).
106. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 655 n.7 (1976).
107. 415 U.S. 481, 505 (1973).
108. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 587 (1977).
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Justice Rehnquist elaborated on this standard, novel with him,
in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe:
"Indian law" draws principally upon the treaties drawn and
executed by the Executive Branch and legislation passed by
Congress. These instruments, which beyond their actual text
form the backdrop for the intricate web of judicially made In-
dian law, cannot be interpreted in isolation but must be read in
light of the common notions of the day and the assumptions of
those who drafted them. 10
9
This remarkable passage (1) attacks judicial precedent in Indian
law; (2) attacks the validity of the "actual text" of treaties and
statutes; and, hence, (3) reposes the ultimate source of Indian law
in the "assumptions" of draftsmen and the "common notions of
the day." It thus asserts that, in Indian law, the Court plays an
essentially passive role. It does almost nothing but treaty and
statute interpretation. Moreover, it does not interpret mere
documents but rather the "assumptions" of individuals who may
have been in their graves for more than a century. Finally,
because Justice Rehnquist seems to be referring to the "common
notions" of white Americans and their elected officials, rather
than of the Indians, his method of construction would turn the
149-year-old principle inside out. In effect, statutory ambiguities
would be resolved in favor of the government."'
Legislative intent is not, of course, irrelevant to statutory inter-
pretation. But, we enforce statutes, not the often elusive intent
behind them. The very difficulty in divining collective legislative
intent makes it a useful interpretive guide only after more impor-
tant considerations have been dealt with. In Indian law the
Choate tenet of construction is appropriate, for at least five
reasons:
109. 435 U.S. 191, 206 (1978).
110. The Rehnquist canons offend a second primary tenet of statutory interpretation
in Indian law. Ever since Worcester, the Court has shown a willingness to consider the
broad historical picture in passing judgment on Indian cases. Often, for instance, an
opinion will begin with a detailed analysis of the circumstances leading up to the con-
troversy and deal with both the special situation of Indians in the matter and other
statutes and treaties relevant to the matter. This approach is still very much alive. Less
than two months after Mitchell, the Court stated, "We... require courts, in considering
whether a particular congressional action was taken in pursuance of congress' power to
manage and control tribal lands for the Indians' welfare, to engage in a thoroughgoing
and impartial examination of the historical record." United States v. Sioux Nation, 448
U.S. 371, 415-16 (1980). Justice Rehnquist, it seems, would restrict that examination to
white America.
[Vol. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol8/iss2/10
NOTES
(1) It derives from a long history of judicial contemplation of
Indian matters, rather than the recent ruminations of, essentially,
one man.
(2) Government-Indian issues are inherently bilateral, and have
been historically recognized as such, because they involve rela-
tions between two different and distinct peoples.
(3) Indians are even more vulnerable to maladroit draftsman-
ship in unilaterally enacted statutes, where they may not have
been consulted, than in agreement/statutes, where they have been
and Choate applies.
(4) The congressional trust responsibility, as announced in
Morton and Weeks, mandates statutory beneficence toward In-
dians.
(5) It only makes sense that inadequate statutes be resolved
against their drafters.
At present, the canon of statutory interpretation in Indian law
seems to depend on who is handing down the opinion. Obviously,
however, if the Rehnquist approach gains ascendancy, it could
pose a serious problem for development of an effective Indian
remedy for breach of trust. If the Court can declare that treaties,
statutes, and its own prior decisions do not mean what they say
they do, then it can sucessfully claim that allusions to a govern-
ment trust obligation do not really refer to an enforceable trust
obligation. The existence of the trust is firmly established, but
such an interpretive end-run around plain meaning to "intent"
could conceivably transform it into a trust in name only.
Sovereign Immunity: The Unequivocal Expression Test
The Mitchell Court spent a large portion of its time discussing
sovereign immunity. However, as far as the outcome of the case
went, it was all sound and fury. Statutory interpretation explains
the result completely, and the Court never develops the link be-
tween sovereign immunity and the facts of the case."1 But the
111. Justice White, writing in dissent, disagrees: "the Court today holds that Testan
bars a damages suit against the Government .... " 445 U.S. 535, 547 (1980). His opinion
is entitled to considerable deference, since, among other things, it is the clearest statement
of the reason for the result in the entire case. But, with all due respect, this writer believes
him to be wrong.
The heart of the holding was that the General Allotment Act created a trust corpus
which did not include reservation timber. Hence, the Act would not sustain a breach of
trust suit to recover for damages to the timber. There was no substantive right of any
kind, and this fact alone sufficed for reversal.
It is also true that where there is no substantive right to money damages, the Court of
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dicta cannot be ignored, for the Court at one point states: "We
need not consider whether, had Congress actually intended the
General Allotment Act to impose upon Government all fiduciary
duties ordinarily placed by equity upon a trustee, the Act would
constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity." 112 That is, even if the
private law of trusts applied directly to the government, sovereign
immunity might bar an Indian cause of action for breach.
Mitchell reiterates three main points from previous cases. First,
the United States possesses sovereign immunity, and, hence, "the
terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's
jurisdiction to entertain the suit." II3 Second, the Tucker Act only
"confers jurisdiction upon [the Court of Claims] whenever the
substantive right exists."" ' 4 Consent to suit thus appears
simultaneous with substantive right. Third, such consent "cannot
be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.""'  Hence, it
would seem, no party can bring suit against the government in
the Court of Claims except upon an unequivocally expressed
substantive right. The standard appears quite literal.
Its strictness is largely illusory, though, as examination of the
prior cases shows. In United States v. King,III the question arose
as to whether the Court of Claims had authority to render
declaratory judgments. In deciding it did not, the court stated
that a grant of such broad jurisdiction "cannot be implied but
must be un~quivocally expressed."" ' 7 Thus, in context, the re-
quirement of unequivocal expression refers not to substantive
rights but to extraordinary grants of jurisdictional power.
Context also illuminates United States v. Testan."I Testan not
only cites the unequivocal expression test with approval but states
that the "grant of a right of action must be made with
specificity."" 9 However, this remark follows an assertion that
the Testan plaintiffs "argue that the Tucker Act fundamentally
waives sovereign immunity with respect to any claim invoking a
constitutional provision or a federal statute or regulation, and
makes available any and all generally accepted and important
Claims has no jurisdiction. Thus, the Mitchell Court also found lack of jurisdiction. But
this fact is inessential to the result.
112. 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980).
113. Id. at 538, quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).
114. Id., quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976).
115. Id., quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969).
116. 395 U.S. 1 (1969).
117. Id. at 4.
118. 424 U.S. 392 (1976).
119. Id. at 400.
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forms of redress, including money damages."120 "Specificity"
thus contemplates, not an explicit and detailed written guarantee
of remedy, but rather a reasonable right to money damages, the
only kind the Court of Claims can award.
Proof of this interpretation emerges in the standard the Testan
Court used to decide the case before it: "It follows that the
asserted entitlement to money damages depends upon whether
any federal statute 'can fairly be interpreted as mandating com-
pensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.'
Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct.Cl. at 607, 372 F.2d
at 1009 (1967) ... We are not ready to tamper with these estab-
lished principles .... 12I By way of emphasis, the Court repeated
the fair interpretation standard later.'22 The test of "unequivocal
expression" must therefore be understood as a device that is
relative. The Court may admonish a plaintiff with a tenuous
claim to "unequivocal expression," but when it states the princi-
ple generally, it uses the language of fair inference. 123
One must thus consider whether statutes establishing a "trust"
for Indians "can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation
by the Federal Government" for breach. There are at least two
strong reasons for concluding that they can: (1) The Court has
granted such money damages in the past. The Creek 24 and
Seminole125 cases, it is true, reached the Court under special
jurisdictional statutes and thus had cleared the barrier of
sovereign immunity before the Court heard them. However, in
both the Court ruled that government's fiduciary obligation
created a substantive right to compensation. Under Testan, such
a right also constitutes waiver of immunity. It is worth noting
that no precedent at all existed in either King or Testan. (2) Trust
terminology becomes meaningless without a cause of action for
breach. Where statutory language loses all sense without an en-
forceable remedy, it is a fair inference that a substantive right to
sue has been conferred. Again, the statutes that plaintiffs relied
upon in King and Testan retained their meaning even after the
adverse decisions.
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 402.
123. Such a standard harmonizes with both traditional practice and public policy. For
instance, a requirement of unequivocal expression of right to damages could prevent par-
ties contracting with the government from suing for breach.
124. 295 U.S. 103 (1935).
125. 316 U.S. 286 (1942).
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The unequivocal expression test would appear to be a chimera.
Yet the ease with which it can be lifted out of context and made
to appear a comprehensive precept, as in Mitchell, suggests the
possibility of abuse. Indeed, it is hard to see why the Mitchell
Court even broached the idea that a complete government fidu-
ciary obligation might not waive sovereign immunity, unless it
had such application in mind. At the same time, the reluctance of
the Court to decide this case on waiver grounds implies it is aware
of the difficulties involved in doing so. For the moment, then,
statutory interpretation seems a more serious obstacle to remedy
than sovereign immunity.
Outlook
The literal law is easily the greatest Indian asset in the attempt
to establish an effective remedy for breach of trust. So many
cases, statutes, and treaties refer to a trust responsibility that the
Court can hardly deny a cause of action without appearing ar-
bitrary and contentious. The legislative intent and unequivocal
expression tests may make inroads here nonetheless, but their use
will demand some sinuous logic.
Mitchell does indicate, however, that the current Court may be
trying to limit Indian breach of trust actions. If so, its most
vulnerable target may be the government's umbrella trust obliga-
tion to tribes, arising out of its course of dealing with them and
independent of specific legal instruments.' This judicially
created duty might fall to the Rehnquist emphasis on statutes and
treaties, or suffer reduction through narrow usage of the fair in-
terpretation test. As it offers hope of the broadest and most
thorough protection for all Indians, its existence and growth war-
rant the most vigorous promotion.
It is also possible that the Court will tend to construe govern-
ment breaches of trust as fifth amendment takings. Indeed, the
government's brief in Mitchell strongly urged this approach upon
the Court. Such a course, if broadly pursued, could reduce or
eliminate -any government duty to make trust property produc-
tive, as in Manchester Band,' or to avoid indirect damage to In-
dian interests, as in Pyramid Lake.128 This kind of diversion
would clearly curtail the efficacy of a breach remedy
126. Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923).
127. 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
128. 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973).
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A further obstacle may lie in the absence of a coherent model
of the government-Indian relation. As things stand, recognition
of a breach of trust action might be seen as a venture into dark,
uncharted territory, with but the feeble lantern of 150 years' talk
of a fiduciary responsibility. In any case, the need for such a
model is plain, since without it the trust relation must remain
amorphous and confused and decisions thus unpredictable.
Toward a Model of the Government-Indian Relation
In 1886 the Supreme Court observed, "The relation of Indian
tribes ... to the people of the United States has always been an
anomalous one and of complex character.""12 The description is
still apt. But it is not inevitable. The relation can be cast into
trust terms that not only impose a reliable structure on the field
but also take the uniqueness of the relation into account. The
following brief sketches are meant to give some idea of the
possibilities.
The Model of Plenary Power
According to the Model of Plenary Power, Congress created
the Indian trust, since it held title to the land, and nominated the
executive branch as trustee. Moreover, Congress retained the
right to alter the provisions of the trust whenever it wished, and
thus it could redefine its powers and obligations annually. It
could even eliminate certain beneficiaries from the trust relation-
ship, as it did when it unilaterally abrogated treaties.
This model accords with history fairly well. It explains why In-
dians reaped so few benefits under federal "guardianship," for,
since they never owned the trust corpus, they had no legitimate
reason for control over its disposition. It indicates why Congress
was for so long immune from trust obligations, for these do not
apply to a settlor. It partly explains why the executive branch has
been more open to breach of trust suits, for a trustee does have
certain duties. It even goes some way toward supporting the
Rehnquist legislative intent test, for, since congressional statutes
constitute the manifestation of intent in this model, inquiry into
purpose is appropriate.
However, the construct has serious flaws. First, and most im-
portant, the presumption that Congress held original title is fac-
tually incorrect. The United States obtained title by conquest and
129. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886).
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arrogation. The Indians held title to North America long before
the whites arrived, and this model can only stand if one refuses to
admit it. 3°
Second, it was one thing for the government to assert title to
Indian land, and another to occupy it. To do the latter, the
government entered into hundred of treaties in which it pledged
itself to specific concessions. This model ignores the essentially
contractual nature of these agreements and treats the government
obligations laid out in them as gratuitous services which can be
withdrawn at will. 3 '
Third, the model has certain internal contradictions. For in-
stance, although the executive branch acts as trustee, Congress
appears to retain title to the corpus. Such an arrangement is not
properly a trust at all but an agency.' 32 Moreover, there is a
tendency toward fusion of function between settlor and trustee
here that is quite extraordinary, and which creates a conflict of
interest so acute as to lead, perhaps, to an effective beneficial in-
terest in the government. Such an arrangement is also not a trust.
Fourth, of course, case law has rendered the model out of
date. Decisions like Morton and Weeks, in imposing fiduciary
obligations on the Congress, have recognized that: (1) it is not
really a settlor; (2) its function does partly merge with the ex-
ecutive's; and (3) the resulting conflict of interest may be
undesirable.
Ultimately, the Model of Plenary Power does not describe a
trust at all. In addition to the problems above, it lacks the first
element of a lawful trust: enforceability. 33
The Model of Partial Responsibility
According to the Model of Partial Responsibility, Congress for
awhile acted as settlor, with a right to modify the terms of the
trust, then became a trustee with limited duties. The Indians were
also settlors, but their impact was far less, and this survives main-
ly in treaties and the rule construing ambiguous statutes in their
favor. They have now become beneficiaries. Moreover, to the ex-
130. But it is not hard to imagine a proper application of this model. If, for instance,
the government offered unconditionally to hold the Siskiyou National Forest in Califor-
nia in trust for the Modoc Indians, the model could apply. Congress as settlor could con-
tinually determine terms for the trust, and as long as the Modocs retained some beneficial
interest, as pure gainers they could not cavil.
131. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1902).
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 8(a); Scorr, § 8; BOGERT, § 15.
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 23.
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tent that executive orders have affected the trusteeship, the ex-
ecutive branch can also be called a settlor, but it more like a
trustee with greater duties than Congress.
Except for the absence of an umbrella trust obligation, this
model roughly describes the current situation. A main feature of
interest is that the manifestation of intent-derived basically
from documents-commonly leaves the terms of the trust am-
biguous. Yet the courts do not often resort to the private law of
trusts to clear them up, as they would do at once in any similar
situation. Moreover, the judiciary tends to act, if at all, mainly to
right instances of arrant injustice, rather than to impose affirm-
ative obligations on the trustees. The beneficiaries thus profit
minimally from the relation.
The Model of General Responsibility
This model dispenses with the concept of the settlor. Congress
and the executive branch are cotrustees. The manifestation of in-
tent arises from the course of dealing of the government and In-
dians. Since its terms are ambiguous, the private law of trusts ap-
plies in all cases, except where prior documents grant the Indian
beneficiaries greater rights than would private law, or where the
trusteeship obligation conflicts in a serious way with government
obligations to the public good.
The Model of General Responsibility represents the triumph of
the overall, independent trust responsibility. Its virtues include
simplicity, coherence, comprehensiveness, fairness, and predic-
tability. It fulfills the promise of decades of judicial precedent. Its
main disadvantage, partly illumined by Pyramid Lake, lies in the
clashes that could ensue between government obligations to dif-
ferent parts of the citizenry.
The Model of Restitution
If ethics were law, the government-Indian relationship might
properly be deemed a constructive trust. "A constructive trust
arises where a person who holds title to property is subject to an
equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he
would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it." 134
Such "unjust enrichment may arise out of the wrongful acquisi-
tion of title to property. This is the case where the title is acquired
by fraud or duress or undue influence." '' It need scarcely be
134. Scorr, § 462. See BOGERT, § 471.
135. ScowT, § 462.2. See BOGERT, § 471.
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said that the government gained title to Indian land through
duress (conquest), or that it induced most tribes to sign treaties
through fraud or undue influence.
The constructive trust is a remedy, rather than a trust per se. It
subjects the constructive trustee to the duty of returning the
property to the "beneficiary" so as to restore the status quo. The
Court rejected this option with regard to Indian land quite de-
liberately in Johnson v. M'Intosh,'36 and for a number of reasons
it cannot realistically be applied today. However, the underlying
rationale and goal of the constructive trust could be joined to the
Model of General Responsibility. The new model, like the old,
would have no settlor and would rely on private trust law.
However, the goal would be not merely profit to the beneficiaries
but restoration of as much as possible of the appropriated trust
corpus.
The Model of Indian Expectations
This model begins with a leap of the imagination. It assumes
that the Indians, as settlors, voluntarily vested title to their land
in the government as a trustee for themselves. It then asks what
terms the Indians would have provided in such a trust.
The model could be especially helpful with regard to treaties
that either confer particular advantages on tribes, or ought to. In
asking, "Would this tribe have willfully vested the rights it did in
the government on these terms?," one necessarily considers both
the stronger bargaining points of the tribe, and the dividends it
might reasonably expect for them. Such a test could be used both
to resolve ambiguities in language and remedy clear injustices.
But it does have certain drawbacks. First, it is somewhat
speculative. Like the legislative intent test, it involves divination
of the will, and might thus lead to disputable holdings. Second,
there seems an inescapable element of Monday morning quarter-
backing in assessing reasonable commercial practice of a century
ago or more. Third, it risks sovereignty confrontations with the
United States. Thus, as an integral structure, this model is not as
firm or clear as some of the others, and it might best function as
an adjunct to the Model of General Responsibility.
Conclusion
As these constructs indicate, one cannot give framework to
trust law without imputing some goal to the trust itself. For in-
136. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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stance, the purpose of the Model of Plenary Power was to sub-
jugate Indians. The purpose of the Model of Partial Responsibili-
ty seems to be to maintain them at subsistence level. At the same
time, the minimum legitimate purpose of a trust is promotion of
the beneficiary's interest. Logic, fairness, and the plain meaning
of words mandate enforcement of the latter goal. This Court
probably will, if pressed, find an Indian remedy for breach of
trust. But it will also likely limit it, through devices like the
legislative intent test. Justice will receive a nod, and the problems
of the reservation will persist.
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